SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad

DigitalCollections@SIT
African Diaspora ISPs

African Diaspora Collection

10-1-2001

Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives: The Growing
Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana
Sasha Wright

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/african_diaspora_isp
Recommended Citation
Wright, Sasha, "Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives: The Growing Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana" (2001). African
Diaspora ISPs. Paper 73.
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/african_diaspora_isp/73

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the African Diaspora Collection at DigitalCollections@SIT. It has been accepted for inclusion
in African Diaspora ISPs by an authorized administrator of DigitalCollections@SIT. For more information, please contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives:
The Growing Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana

By
Sasha Wright
School for International Training
December, 2001

Acknowledgements:

Thanks to all my family for your support in all my journeys and projects around the world.
Gracias a miss companerous bolivianos particularmente Marcela, Oscar, Lupe, Omar Carmen y
mi abuelita por instigar mis intereses en el asunto de los movimientos sobre agua. Su corage en
frente de todo la injusticia que encontramos cada dia me da la inspiracion de conseguir.
Thanks to Sarah and Alison for your support, friendship, and inspiration.
admiration of all you do.

I’m in constant

Thank you to Naana, Uncle Ebo and Uncle Eric for your personal and academic support this
semester.
Thanks to Sallome and Rashayna for your friendship, encouragement and love during our time
here in Ghana together.
Thanks to all the activists who gave me your time and energy to help make this project possible.
Special thanks to Barzini Tanoh for the books, introductions and hospitality.

Table of Contents

Abstract
Introduction: The global debate over the privatization of basic resources.
Methodology
A brief political history of Ghana
Colonialism and Independence
The First Republic
Liberalization and Class Conflict
The Rawlings Period

Water, Commodity or Social good?
The Context of the Debate
The Contract and its Implications

The Emerging Movement Against the Privatization of Water
The Coalition
Actors Within the Campaign
Workers
Students
NGOs
Faith Based Organisations
Community Organisations

Opportunities and Challenges
Conclusion

Abstract

This paper examines the movement against water privatization.

First I trace the

development of social struggle in Ghana. I then outline the issues in the debate over water
privatization. Finally I describe development in the movement against water privatization, and
their significance.

Introduction: The global debate over the privatization of basic resources.

The protests of Seattle Washington 1999 highlighted the growing dissatisfaction with neoliberal economic policies that have failed to provide sustainable development and have a caused a
corresponding drop in the quality of life in workers and disenfranchised groups around the world.
Global capitalist interests (multinationals and the states that support them) constantly expand into
new terrain, most recently into the social services, including water. The infringement of the
private sector with their profit-based motives into the social services has sparked concern and
protests in both developing and industrialized countries. Water in particular is becoming a charged
political issue.
In Cochabamba, Bolivia the attempted privatization the regions water supply sparked a
struggle in which workers, farmers, professionals, environmentalists and students united, fighting
intense street battles and blockades, successfully forcing the Bolivian government to rescind its
contract with the multinational Bechtel and return water to the public sector.1
Hence the proposed privatization of the water sector in Ghana has led to speculation on the
potential for the mobilization of he diverse contingencies that will be affected by the deal.2
Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to win independence in 1957, generating
excitement among pan-africanists, nationalists and socialists that the newly independent
government led by Kwame Nkrumah would successfully wrest the economic and political life
from neo-colonial interests.

Nonetheless in the decades since independence Ghana, like the

majority of formerly colonized countries has failed to break from its subordinate relationship with
international capital.3 Since the early 1980s Ghana has undergone Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs), which includes the liberalization of the economy in the interests of foreign investors and
the slashing of government expenditure. The privatization of water is a conditionality of SAPs in
many developing countries, particularly “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) such as Ghana.4
The prominence of the debate over water privatization raises several questions. What
affect does the attempt to privatize a basic life-sustaining resource such as water have on the
legitimacy of government to represent its citizen’s interests? What types of coalitions form around

1

Raquel Guiterez, Alvaro Garcia and Luis Tapia. “La Forma Multitud de la Politica de las Necesidades Vitales.” In El
Retorno de la Bolivia Plebeya. (La Paz: Muela de Diablo, 2000)
2
Gumisai Mutume. “Resistance to World Bank privatization (water, etc) in Ghana.”
(http://www.fpcn-global.org/pipermail/africa-news/2000-November/000013.html, retrieved 9/12/01). P.1.
3
Kwame A. Ninsin. “Introduction: Thirty-Seven Years of development Experience.” In The State Development and
Politics in Ghana. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CONDESRIA, 1989) p. 1
4
Sarah Grusky. “IMF Forces African Countries to Privatize Water”.
(http://afjn.cua.edu/Water%20Privatization, retrieved 9/12/01), p. 1.

the issue of water privatization and what political potential do they embody? Additionally, what
role, if any, can a movement addressing the issue of water privatization have in creating
awareness, links and mobilization around related societal issues? The movement against water
privatization in Ghana is in its initial phases, however trends are emerging which suggest possible
answers to these questions.

Methodology

Secondary Sources:
I utilized several books that covered import aspects in the history of social movements,
structural adjustment and water quality and availability in Ghana. I used sources available to me at
the University of Legon bookstore, later supplementing these with materials recommended and
loaned from an organizer in the water campaign. Though I by no means covered the full available
published literature related to the topic of social movements in Ghana I was able to develop an
understanding of certain key periods.
Since the privatization of water and the movement against doing so is a recent and current
phenomenon I used newspaper articles and editorials that I collected over the semester pertaining
to the subject. This was helpful in following developments in the privatization process and the
debate, though again as I only arrived in the country in September I was not able to review the
complete amount of material available through articles. I was however able to review some back
articles in publications that give special attention to the issue of water privatization such as the
Public Agenda.
I was also given documents pertaining to the goals and stances of the Coalition and related
organizations, which gave some context to understanding the dynamics of the forming movement.
I additionally watched a video of the conference on water privatization held in May of 2001
where the Ghana Coalition Against the Privatization of Water was formed. This was important in
giving me a sense of important events that occurred which I was unable to observe firsthand.

Primary Sources:
I relied primarily on interviews, conversations and observations to understand the
movement forming around the issue of water privatization. I actually began by visiting several
government agencies involved in the restructuring process including the Restructuring Secretariat
of the Water Resource Center, the Ghana Water Company and the Accra Metropolitan Authority.
This had no bearing on the movement against privatization itself. From one of these visits I was
able to obtain the contact information of ISODEC, a Non-Governmental Organisation that is
playing a prominent role in the coalition. From 2 members of ISODEC I was given the contact
information of another organizer in the campaign against water privatization, with whom I was
able to attend a small neighbourhood meeting of concerned residents of Madina on water
privatization, where I was introduced to other activists involved in the campaign. This included a
student activist, who informed me of a student meeting at Legon on the issue of water

privatization, which I attended. There I had the opportunity of meeting other students involved in
the issue, two of whom I later interviewed. I also watched a discussion on campus in which
covered the issue of water privatization where I was able to gain a first hand sense of student
sentiments on the subject. I additionally interviewed members of the Christian Coalition and the
TUC, to get a sense of the positions of certain important potential players in the struggle over
water privatization, namely religious groups, labour, and NGOs.

Methodological Issues:
I was severely limited by time. Though I discovered that observation was the best way to
understand the positions, potentials and problems of the developing movement I was only able to
observe one neighbourhood meeting, which was a new association hence small, and one student
meeting which occurred during exams, therefore also small. Though it was helpful to interview a
member of the TUC leadership, it would have been more pertinent to attend workers meetings on
water privatization (many of which occurred in October) to understand mobilization among the
rank and file, however that was not possible this month. Likewise, though I was able to talk to a
couple religious leaders I would have gained a more well –rounded view of the role of religious
associations if I could have also talked with members and leaders of the smaller churches and
mosques. During the period in which I conducted the investigation there was a lull in activity so I
was also not able to attend any water rallies that were recently organized in certain communities.
To fill in the gaps I relied on the accounts of activists involved in the organisation of these events.
Due to time limitations I decided to focus the study on the Accra area. Although water
privatization affects all major urban areas there have only been small developments in other cities
to this point. Similarly, though the rural areas are affected by the privatization deal, rural water
systems themselves are not up for privatization, so far there has been little political activity in these
areas.
I have made no attempt to be objective or politically detached from the issue at stake. My
interest in water privatization was formed my association with the Coalition in Defense of Water
and Life (La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la Vida) in Bolivia, the coalition that formed to
defeat water privatization in Cochabamba.
In any case I am not analyzing whether or not water should be privatized but the movement
forming in opposition. I explained my position and activities in Bolivia to those I spoke with. I
believe this helped clarify that I was gathering this information in hopes of producing something
slightly helpful to those concerned with the issue of water, not in portraying the coalition in any
way that would be harmful to it.

My questions varied greatly on the context of the interview and altered over the course of
the study. However the basic points I sought to discuss were:

When and how did you/your organisation first get involved in the coalition against water
privatization?
Why did you feel it was important to get involved?
What is the value of the presence of your sector/organisation in the coalition?
Are you a member of any other organizations? Or have you been involved in any other
campaigns/political activities?
What discussions or activities concerning water privatization have you/your organisation
been involved in?
What potential do you see for mobilization around this issue among your
sector/organisation?
What other organizations/individuals have you collaborated with in organizing discussions
or actions around the issue of water privatization?
Have you made any attempt to contact people or organizations concerned with the issue or
water privatization in other countries?

Additional questions for campaign organisers:

Which social constituencies do you feel are most critical to incorporate into the campaign?
What strategies do you use to promote awareness on the issue of water privatization and
mobilize different sectors/individuals/organizations?
How is the coalition structured?
What fund-raising methods do you use?
How do you utilize the media?
How is the political climate conducive or not to the campaign water privatization at this
point?
Has the coalition made any attempts been made to connect water privatization to other
issues?

A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF GHANA

To understand the context of a movement against the privatization of water it is necessary
to examine the political and economic evolution of Ghana, giving attention to the following:

1.

The tension between the interests of international capital, the interests of Ghanaian
citizens, and (after independence) the role of the state in this equation.

2.

The battle for political and economic control between the “big men” and “small boys”5
and

3.

The composition, tactics and alliances of the left wing in Ghana.

Colonialism and Independence Movements

Since the advent of the slave trade and later British colonial rule the economic and political
processes of the area that is now Ghana have been defined by the interests of international
capitalism.6
British colonial powers arranged the Gold Coast economy to serve as a source of raw
materials (principally gold and cocoa) to feed growing industries in Europe. Investment into
infrastructure and social services was kept to the bare minimum required for the functioning of the
economy and the colonial government.

Within the colonial framework some traditional

authorities, successful business men and cocoa farmers and those with access to higher education
arose to form an elite class.7
Likewise, the demand for independence surfaced among several distinct social classes. On
the one hand were the educated elite and business men who wanted independence so they could
rise to the economic and political status they believed was due to them.

Members o this

intelligensia formed the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 to agitate for “the
attainment of full self – government in the shortest possible time”.8 The UGCC subsequently
invited Kwame Nkrumah, a young lawyer educated in the United States and England and involved
in pan-African circles, to act as the general secretary.
However the strength of the independence movement lay in the increasing numbers of
primary school graduates. Basic education was essential to their political formation for several
reasons including the acquisition of the common language English creating a stronger sense of
5

*The terms “big men” and “small boys” refer to the social status of the wealthy and working classes, respectively.
Paul Nugent. Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. (Accra: Asempa Publishers, 1995).
6
Walter Rodney. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972)
7
Dennis Austin. Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964)
8
Ibid 7, p.7

national unity. Graduates also formed scholars unions, youth movements and literary and debating
societies. Here discussions arose concerning local and national politics, and from these circles a
grew a “new a political class” and an “anti-chief, anti-colonial movement”. In this manner a
nationalistic independence movement grew far more rapidly than the colonial administration or the
educated elite had predicted.9
Several economic crises in both rural and urban areas also contributed to the fall of colonial
rule. During the 1940s a blight of the cocoa trees caused a crisis in which farmers were forced to
cut large portions of their crop, a policy that many desperate farmers viewed suspiciously, leading
to their ready acceptance of UGCC demands for independence. At the same time in the cities, a
shortage of imports caused prices to rise on a range of goods while the real wages dropped. Many
held the United Africa Company and other European trading firms as responsible for these
developments, and began to boycott non-essential imports, which after several months developed
into riots against foreign owned businesses in 1948.10
Colonial authorities held UGCC leaders responsible for the riots although at this juncture
events were entirely outside their control. Nonetheless the detainment of UGCC leaders increased
their popularity farther than their campaigning had succeeded in doing to that point. The riots did
exacerbate differences between the UGCC and Nkrumah resulting in the removal of Nkrumah as
General Secretary.

The UGCC allied with certain chiefs worked for constitutional reform.

Nkrumah continued to develop a following among the youth and founded the Convention Peoples
Part (CPP) in 1950. After an ensuing conflict during the writing of the constitution and Nkrumah’s
imprisonment the CPP won the first national elections of 1951, defeating the opposition again in
1954 and 1956. Full independence was achieved in 1957.11

The First Republic

The CPP period, defined by its nationalist politics and experimentation in state capitalism,
set the framework against which future development policy and political movements emerged.12
Nkrumah’s development strategy aimed at increasing Ghana’s economic strength and
sovereignty through industrialization and the stronger integration of the economy. Beginning in
1960 Nkrumah brought large portions of the commercial and manufacturing systems under state
control, in the same period entering into a relationship with the IMF and World Bank to finance
the Volta River Project and other projects. The CPP however, refused to cooperate with the

9

Ibid 7
Ibid 7
11
Ibid 7
12
Ibid 3, p.4
10

conditionalities attached to the loans received as doing as conflicted with their development
policy.13
After independence government officials used the state as the principal tool of capitalist
accumulation. Indeed the subordination of the economy as a whole to foreign capitalists made the
development of the capitalist class by any other fashion impossible.14 This occurred despite the
fact that the ruling coalition upon election was drawn from the “verandah boys” who displaced the
business elite and intelligencia, and that they had gained popularity on the basis that they held the
same interests as common people.15
After independence Nkrumah altered the constitution to allow for one party rule, hence
equating the party with the state.16 The state was the largest employer and the TUC and other
parties were thus incorporated into the party. This allowed for a great deal of control by the state
over workers, allowing them to tax and reduce wages. Wages in real terms fell after 1964,
however there was little resulting strike activity with real political implications apart from the
railway and harbor workers in 1961.17

Liberalization and Class Conflict
The “big men” had their payback when the NLC overthrow Nkrumah and the CPP in a CIA
supported coup in 1966. the NLC consisted of an alliance of chiefs, businessmen, successful
cocoa farmers, senior civil servants, judges and foreign business interests, and was carried out by
senior army officers.18 The NLC proclaimed they would reverse Nkrumah’s policies of state
development and implement the “Rehabilitation Program” of the IMF. However despite the
introduction of certain measures such as the devaluation of the cedi and the liberalization of trade,
the reduction of government spending, spending in civil and public services and the privatization
of some public enterprises, the NLC failed to significantly alter the role of the state as the principle
economic actor and means of accumulation. This discrepancy between policy and practise was
due in part to internal divisions of interests, but also to the strong backlash from students and
workers to these policies. The NLC was forced to open elections in which the Progress Party (PP)
under Buis came to power in 1969.19

13

Kwesi Jonah. “Changing Relation Between the IMF and the Government of Ghana 1960-1987.” In The State
Development and Politics in Ghana. eds. Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p.
97-98.
14
Kwame A. Ninsin. “State, Capital and Labour Relations, 1961-1987.” In The State Development and Politics in
Ghana. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 16.
15
Ibid 5, p.6
16
Ibid 7
17
Ibid 14, p. 23-24.
18
Ibid 5, p.8
19
Ibid 13, p. 102

In order to prevent the same problem with internal political differences interfering the
implementation of the IMF stabilization program, the IMF and World Bank reorganized
government decision-making bodies. However the PP faced such strong opposition they were
unable to implement these policies before their overthrow, even though they attempted to outlaw
strikes and later the TUC itself.20
The PP were overthrown in a coup by the National Redemption Council, later known as the
Supreme Military Council led by General I.K. Acheampong. The SMC policies such as the
devaluation of the cedi.

However their indigenization policies led to no real solutions for

workers.21 The economy worsened, in part from the oil crisis of 1974, workers wages dropped in
the face of increasing inflation. Strikes escalated in this period, in number and duration, supported
by students nationwide. The professional classes also allied themselves through the Peoples
Movement for Freedom and Justice demonstrating the de-legitimacy of government through all
sections of society.

Labour had been fighting for over a decade and was strong both

organisationally and politically. The ruling classes were further weakened by the Armed Forces
Liberation Council (AFRC) coup in 1979. The return to civilian rule under Limann of the Progress
Party did little to abate the crisis.22
The extent of de-legitimacy of government, and the heightened class conflict created a
situation with the greatest potential for social change in Ghanaian history, yet no social movement
with the capacity to harness and channel this energy existed at this juncture.23

The Rawlings Period
On December 31, 1981 units of the armed forces, led by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings overthrew
the PP, establishing themselves as the People’s National Defense Council (PNDC). Rawlings
announced the change of government over the radio, explaining that the transition was not to be
viewed as a coup but a revolution. In the first unstable days he immediately sought to solidify
support among the lower ranks of the armed forces, workers, radicals and the peasantry.24
The PNDC initiated Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) and the Peoples Defense
Committees (PDCs) to operate on the workplace and community levels respectively, with the
charge of developing the revolution from below. Workers used WDCs as a vehicle to defend their
interests in the workplace and attack management for their corrupt and anti-labor practices. WDCs
operated alongside the existing trade union structures, sometimes in cooperation or conflict,
depending on individual cases. These developments led to the formation of the Association of
20

Zaya Yeebo. Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power; Rawlings: Saviour or Demagogue. (London: New Beacon
Books, 1991) p. 14.
21
Ibid. 14, p.28
22
Ibid 20, p.22
23
Ibid 20 p. 24
24
Ibid 5 p. 40-42

Local Unions (ALU) by militant labour leaders who subsequently took over the TUC forcing the
resignation of the labour leadership whom they accused of being corrupt, bureaucratic and
undemocratic.25 WDCs also successfully took over two factories, the Ghana Textile Printing
Company Limited and the Juapong Textiles Limited, in response to the threatened retrenchment of
thousands of workers. 26
These actions differ in nature and form from previous labour struggles. Through the
WDCs works had a tool which facilitated the “independence, autonomy and militancy of labour”.
Workers did not rely merely on strikes, but engaged in mass mobilization, direct confrontation, and
collective actions of a political, anti-imperialist nature. Initially the PNDC was obliged to support
to these struggles.27
Also central to the PNDC program was the campaign against kalabule, the corrupt
professional and business classes who had capitalized on their positions in previous regimes to
accumulate wealth at the expense of the masses. National Investigation Committees (NICs)
formed to investigate anyone with over 50,000 cedis in savings, and the Citizens Vetting
Committees (CVCs) were charged with probing the actions of those whose lifestyles could not be
readily explained. The CVCs had the power to try and sentence, with Rawlings as the only body
of appeal. The attack on the kalabule served to weaken the strength and confidence of the upper
classes, while cementing their antagonistic relationship with the Rawlings regime whom they
viewed as usurpant “small boys”. 28
The end of 1982 marks the transition in the political stance and policies of the PNDC,
which was to drastically alter its relationship to labour. Initial signs of their changing discourse on
people’s power occurred when the PNDC renamed the P/WDCs Committees in Defense of the
Revolution (CDRs) and incorporated them under their own authority. P/WDCs additionally lost
their autonomy in the workplace with regards to management. Interim Management Committee
(IMCs) which had sprung up n workplaces to give workers decision making capacity in their
corporations were turned into Joint Consultative Committees which embodied no real power.29
The PNDC’s treatment of the Pioneer Food Cannery struggle and the dissolution of the ICCWDCs at a critical juncture in the dispute exemplifies their increasing reluctance to back the
struggles of working people.30 PNDC policy changes facilitated the demobilization of the left and
labour and opened the door for the implementation of SAP.
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Ibid 5, p. 34-35
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Ibid 26, p. 65-66
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In 1983 and PNDC implemented a harsh structural adjustment policy while claiming that
economic reform was their own idea and in line with the revolution. The PNDC used the food
shortages, coup attempts and the influx of Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria to justity the nend for
new economic policies.31
SAP seeks to reduce the role of the state and liberalize economic regulations to make the
economy attractive to foreign investors. SAP measures include the devaluation of the cedi,
increasing government revenue through retrenchment of workers, phasing out subsidies on social
services and introducing fees on these services, privatizing government run services, reducing
trade barriers and raising interest rates.32
Such measures obviously gain little popularity among the working and poor who deal with
higher unemployment rates, and rising prices, particularly of imports. However the weakened
working class was unable to successfully resists these measures. Workers feared to raise their
voices in opposition because during retrenchments militant workers were the first to go.
Additionally, the “old guard” regained power over the TUC in the previous elections. While the
reinstated leaders had less ties and obligations to the PNDC. Freeing them to be critical of ERP
measures, they returned to methods such as collective bargaining to defend traditional workers
demands.33 Additionally, the PNDC increasingly used force against mobilizing workers. The
PNDC was forced to step back on the issue of the abolition of leave allowances, when the rank the
file was up in arms and the TUC declared a national strike. However this incident demonstrates
that workers were back to using the trade unions, and the trade unions used negotiation not
confrontation in their relationship with government.34
When Rawlings came into power he began a discourse on the meaning of democracy,
advocating that democracy was more than elections but involved people influencing the decision
making process. This idea resonated among Ghanaian working people who had seen little change
in the material conditions of life, or the reflections of their interests in policy during the series of
elected governments and military regimes since the 1966 coup. The claim to direct democracy
was legitimized to the population in part through the proliferation of the Defense Committees and
other civil society organizations in 1982, despite the fact that the decision making process was
based in Accra and the actual PNDC consisted of 7 members, 4 of them military officials. 35
Over time Rawlings discourse altered from “you the people” to “we the PNDC” as the
catalyst in the revolution.36 The murders of three high court judges and a retired army officer,
while they could not be directly linked to the PNDC raised questions on the nature of the regime.
31
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As time went on the Rawlings period was marked by political prisoners, disappearances,
executions, censorship of the press and the restriction of civil liberties, leading to what became
known as the “culture of silence”, the fear of oppositional forces to speak or act out against the
PNDC government.37 Then, in 1989 developments abroad and nationally inspired a push for a
return to democratic rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union and of numerous dictatorships in
Africa gave hope to PNDC restrictions on religious institutions and the press. A broad based
coalition consisting of elements of the left and right formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice
(MFJ) in August of 1990.38 The PNDC, taking stock of its electoral potential agreed to open up
for elections. The electoral period brought the revival of the two traditional political tendencies, of
Nkrumah and Busia to life. However the PNDC was able to use its position both to prevent
political activity by the other parties in the initial stages, and to use government resources in the
campaign. The PNDC/NDC were also accused of rigging the elections, however their success also
hinges on the oppositions failure to offer alternatives to the fundamental PNDC policies, namely
SAPs.39
Between the return to electoral politics and the defeat of the NDC in the 2000 elections the
greatest challenge to the Rawlings regime were the Ku me Preko protests against value added taxes
(VAT) in 1995, in which thousands filled the streets of Accra and Kumasi. The VAT protests
marked an explosion of anger against the decline in living standards of for working people as a
result of neo-liberal economic policies.40 The Rawlings government was forced to tread more
carefully in the implementation of other programs to hold power through the 1996 elections.
It is worth reiterating certain developments of the Rawlings period that have bearing on the
political scene of Ghana today.

1.

Left forces suffered serious setbacks due to the suppressive nature of the regime.

2.

The believed necessity of removing any vestiges of the PNDC from power has resulted
in the focus of political activity on electoral politics.

3.

The labour movement was weakened in part from the mass retrenchments, and the
labour leadership has focused on gaining rights within the existing framework (i.e.
instead of protesting a labour cutback, negotiating for severance pay for affected
workers).

4.

Despite the compliance of earlier regimes with the IMF and World Bank, the Rawlings
regime was most successful in reorganizing the economy through SAP.
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The move to privatize water results from the neo-liberal economy and it is within this political and
economic framework that a movement against water privatization must operate.

WATER: COMMODITY OR SOCIAL GOOD?

The Context of the Debate
The move to privatize water emerges as part of a growing trend in neo-liberal economics in
which multinational find it most profitable to expand into already existing public markets,
including the profitable social services.41
The IMF and World Bank facilitate this process by making the privatization of water a
condition for the ability to access much needed loans. This is the case in many HIPC countries in
African including Ghana.42
The pending privatization of water in Ghana has caused the future of water management to
develop into a heated national debate, and stakes are high. Currently, water distribution is uneven
and inadequate, particularly in low-income and rural communities. Women and children are
disproportionately affected by this situation as the collection of water falls on their shoulders.
Poor drinking water accounts for 70 percent of diseases in Ghana, and the inadequate treatment of
sewage causes a plethora of environmental problems.43
The NPP government asserts that privatization would improve this situation because
foreign companies would bring much needed capital for investment into the improvement and
expansion of water services, and that transferring management into the private sector would
greatly increase efficiency.44 The government attempts to reassure skeptics that this is not an
outright sale of the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWC) but a temporary lease (Private Sector
Participation (PSP) or Public Private Partnership (PPP).)45
Opponents of the privatization deal argue that PSP or PPP amount to the same thing as
outright privatization, and will only exacerbate existing inequalities in water distribution.46 The
basis for these arguments will be discussed below.

The Contract and its Implications:
The Ghana Water Restructuring Project (GWRP) entails the division of the urban water
sector into Business Units A and B, whose management will fall to 2 of 9 multinational
corporations in the bidding.47 As part of the restructuring process the rural water sector was placed
under the control of the Community Water Supply Agency. Expansion and improvement of
services in rural communities will depend on their ability to provide 10-15 percent of initial capital
41
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cost and then “normal operating fees.”48 The sewage system was also partitioned from the GWC,
and transferred to the Metropolitan Assemblies.49 This means the incoming companies are only
responsible for service provision in the more developed sectors of the water company namely
sewage and rural water will remain in government hands, who will which no longer have the
benefit of subsidies from the urban sector. Instead all profits made in urban water provision may
be used at the discretion of the incoming companies to finance other business operations.50
No provisions within the contract require the incoming multinationals to raise funds to
invest in the poor and inadequate infrastructure (pipelines, pumping capacity, water treatment, etc).
instead, the government of Ghana will raise 500 million dollars from international financial
institutions creating an Operating Investment Fund (OIF). The incoming corporations will finance
all operations from the OIF and earnings from tariff increases.51 Tariffs increases for Ghanaians is
inevitable due the implementation of tariff increases over a 5-year period to achieve “full cost
recovery”. This does not however ensure the expansion of water services considering the contract
gives multinationals control over investment decisions, granting them the ability to neglect
expansion into areas that will not reap profits. The incoming companies profits are further ensured
by an “automatic tariff adjustment formula”, which protects them in cases of inflation or changes
in the exchanged rate.52
Viewing the track record of these multinationals international provides a gauge of their
likelihood to improved efficiency. In fact, the privatization of water has decreased efficiency in a
number of developing and industrialized countries where such restructuring has taken place. This
is largely due to the fact that only 5 multinational corporations dominate the private water sector,
effectively limiting competition. These corporations also have a record of problems with
corruption, lack of transparency and secrecy.53 The implications of this are already apparent in
Ghana from the undemocratic and secretive manner in which the privatization process is being
carried out.54
Hence, the conditions of the GWRP itself, and a review of privatization deals in other
countries effectively disproves the governments claim that privatization will result in improved
efficiency and financial capability. What is apparent is that the multinationals are guaranteed a
profitable, risk free acquisition.55 The government of Ghana does stand to benefit from the loans
they will access upon the completion of the restructuring process as well as the ability to improve
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budget balances, however these are no long term answers for Ghana’s economic crisis. Meanwhile,
Ghanaian citizens will pay dearly for any improvements in the existing infrastructure, with no
pending expansion of services, and more importantly, the majority of the population will not be
able to afford piped water. Moreover, once such a deal is reached citizens have little recourse to
rescind the contract without facing costly lawsuits. Though the contracts are intended to last 10
and 30 years, the dismantling of the companying and the lay-off of public utility workers
demonstrates the permanency of the arrangement.
The privatization of water for the benefit of multinationals and some government officials
at the expense of the citizens of the country is a perfect example neo-liberal economic priorities
and it exemplifies the higher accountability of government to international financial institutions
than to their own citizens. Resistance to these policies by working and poor people who will suffer
the consequences is both crucial and inevitable.

The Emerging Movement Against the Privatization of Water

The Coalition
The GNCAPW was formed upon the initiative of ISODEC, an NGO involved in the
provision of water and sanitation services in low income communities since 1984. ISODEC
organized a conference in May 2001, inviting the participation of other NGOs concerned with
water issues, activists from other African countries, the United States and Europe as well as key
players in the water privatization process including the Water Restructuring Secretariat, the
Minister of Works and Housing and the World Bank representative of Ghana, all of whom
presented their position on the issue. At the end of the conference organizations and individuals in
opposition to the privatization of water issued a statement known as the “Accra Declaration”,
outlining their fundamental position that water is a right not a commodity and its privatization
would only serve to jeopardize the ability of the poor to access safe water. The statement calls
upon government agencies, parliament, and international financing institutions to address the
problematic nature of water privatization.56

The “Accra Declaration” was released over the

internet and calls on organizations and individuals to write letters to the above pro-privatization
institutions.

This marked the beginning of a signature campaign, with approximantly 70

organisations initially signing on.57
The campaign against water privatization began to expand to the grassroots level in
September 2001 when new activists were incorporated into the campaign and subsequently
focused their energies on developing awareness, debate and mobilization among workers, students,
low income neighbourhood, women’s rights advocates and faith based organizations on the issue
of water privatization on the issue of water privatization.58 This is significant because not only do
the above sections of society stand to suffer most from the problematic nature of water
privatization but they also include groups with potential for generating social change.
The GNCAPW is divided geographically with the southern sector representing the Volta,
Eastern, GAR, Central and Western regions. A Coordinating Committee (SCC) directs regional
activities, however the most active structures organisationally are the Local Action Committee
(LACs) based out of communities and workplaces.

Campaign activities include a signature

campaign through which they outreach and make contracts, community meetings which serve
educational organisational functions, water rallies which bring public attention to the issue and
lobbying elected presentatives.59 CAPW utilizes the radio and print media and even take out ads in
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the paper if there is critical information to put out.60 CAPW additionally produces their own
leaflets. The coalition has also solicited the support of journalists through educational meetings
and forums. The coalition utilizes fundraising for additional outreach by combing activities such
as t-shirt sales with the signature campaign. CAPW seeks to fund their activities domestically
through member subscriptions and donations.61
Future CAPW activities include the formalization of registration of members and affiliates,
the organisation of new LACs and the creation of a central office from which to systematize
materials and coordinate activities.62

Actors within the campaign:

Workers:
The strength of the coalition hinges on the support of organized labour, because their
control over the means of production gives them bargaining power with government.

As

demonstrated above, the force of organized labour has been pivotal to the outcome of policy
disputes since colonial times.
Most working people face difficulties with the increasing tariffs inherent in the water
privatization deal. The Public Utilities workers in particular stand to lose from the pending
privatization as only 50 of 3,800 workers are assured of future employment. The government
promises the re-employment of 2,000 PUWU workers in other areas however their track record is
poor: of 946 workers in the last retrenchment only 87 have been re-employed.63
Members of the coalition and workers in factories in Tema and Accra have met to discuss
the issue of water privatization, relating it to other issues such as the casualisation of labour. The
reaction from workers has proved fruitful. The discourse within PUWU workers took a strong
stance against restructuring of the water sector. This is a departure from the past because although
this is not the harshest retrenchment utility workers have faced in recent years it is the first time
workers have decisively opposed the retrenchment itself, instead of attempting to negotiate the
most beneficial severance package possible.64 Workers agreed to come out in opposition to water
privatization on October 3rd, and the TUC leadership declared its official position against the
privatization of water the following day. The TUC leadership also attributes their interest in the
campaign to their concern with related issues such as the WTO and the privatization of other
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utilities namely the telecom and electricity corporations, issues they have discussed with labour
organizations around the world.65
Hence though young, mobilization among workers is significant because the initiative
comes from the rank and file.66 As one TUC officer stated “It has the potential of being the issue
that mobilizes a cross section of people more than any other issue in recent times”.67 This thought
has added weight considering the strategic location of workers in Accra and Tema, urban areas that
directly face the consequences of water privatization.

Students:
Students have historically played a prominent role in the political process of Ghana. ths is
apparent from their catalytic role in the independence movement, in their prominence in fighting
against undemocratic regimes and their presence in solidarity with workers struggles. Students are
an important constituency because of the status of university graduates and they influence they
have no their home communities.68 It is from the universities that the political class emerges, and
universities are the breeding grounds for future activists. “When we speak they listen and they
dare not ignore our voice.”69
A range of SAP policies that entails large cuts in social services directly impact students,
indeed the main issues students have organized around in recent years have been the introduction
of fees and loans. If water is privatized that will cause a significant increase in students RFUF
which is already a problematic payment for many.

University students already have bad

experiences with the privatization of social services reasons to be suspicious of the deals going on
concerning water.70
CAPW began to work among students in September 2001, organizing several
forums on campus, inviting guest speakers such as human rights activists and leaders in CAPW.
Students themselves organized a demonstration in September.71
Students comprise one of the most successful local action committees in the Legon
area. Larger meetings involve 15-20 students, including student leaders, affiliates of other political
organizations such as the ISO and the Students Worker Solidarity Society, and individuals
concerned with the issue.72
However the most noteworthy gauge of student sentiments and potential to organize
around the issue of water privatization was demonstrated by a talk organized at Akuafo Hall,
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Legon campus by proponents of water privatization. Posters advertising the conference claimed
the event would discuss the pros and cons of water privatization. Yet when students arrived at the
talk the speakers consisted only of the “galaxy of pro-privateers”, everyone form the Restructuring
Secretariat to the Minister of Works and Housing.73 Also prominent on the poster was the slogan
“Idem 13” which is commonly known to man free food and drinks on campus, demonstrating the
importance to the ministers of convincing students to come listen to their case in support of water
privatization.
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Activists with the coalition received notice of the meeting and arrived early to

speak with students on their position, and when the floor opened to discussion the students ‘wiped
the floor” of the privatization proponents, ending with the STC president mounting the stage and
declaring that the student government’s official position was against the privatization of water.
The strength of student’s anti-privatization feelings surprised even organizers within the coalition
signifying that “The mood against privatization is both broader and deeper than out most
optimistic assessment had led us to believe. No doubt, this is attributable in important respects to
some of the work we have done. But it also shows that our campaign must hurry up to catch up
and connect with this mood by organizing and strengthening it”75
A more recent talk at Commonwealth Hall, Legon campus, which featured the Minister of
Parliament for the district among others, reinforced the importance of the issue of water
privatization among the student body. Thought it was a Friday night during exam times several
hundred students were in attendance. Water privatization was one of the feature topics and the
students in attendance met the pro-privatisation remarks of the ministers with loud opposition.76

Activists of Left Organisations:
The presence of individual activists of left organizations and the International Socialist
Organisation (ISO) that joined in the work of CAPW since September is valuable. Activists that
have experience in previous campaigns are useful as educational tools in the movement because of
their understanding of issue of water privatization and related globalization concerns. Activists
additionally have experience with networking on the grassroots level, working in a coalition and
they have distinct contracts with activists in other countries.77 Some participants in coalition
activities trace their involvement in the anti-privatization movement since 1983 when the current
structural adjustment policy came into being.78
As well as being some of the main organizers of the campaign certain figures on the left
have spoken to newly forming bases in the communities, or at rallies.
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NGOs:
As mentioned above, NGOs have played and have the potential to play a role within the
coalition. ISODEC initiated the coalition and countless NGOs (an updated list is not available)
representing women and children’s advocates, health and environmental interests have signed on.
NGOs representing special interests groups can serve at educational resources and speakers on
their area of expertise. NGOs can additionally provide links with affiliate organizations in other
countries.79

Faith Based Organisations:
The vast majority of Ghanaian citizens participate in organized religion. Thus religious
organizations provide a valuable forum to engage in debate, education and mobilization around the
issue of water privatization. Faith based organizations have historically taken stances in political
campaigns such as the return to civilian rule.80
The coalition has dialoged with strategic churches and mosques in Accra and Tema, as well
as presenting their position to large faith based organizations.81
Several religious bodies have come out in support of the campaign based on their concern
for the rights of their constituencies and the rights of the poor, one of the most visible being the
Christian Coalition, which incorporates over 25 churches. The Christian Coalition came out with a
press release indicating their position which understands the right to water being a “God-given
right to all people that dwell on this earth”, which would be jeopardized by its privatization. The
statement also demonstrates awareness of anti-water privatization in other parts of the world such
as Bolivia.82 The Coalition was given materials such as a video on the May conference from
ISODEC but they also attribute awareness on the issue from the participation of their leadership in
international conferences on globalisation and literature on the subject in Christian publications.83

Community Organisations:
Community organizations are important in the construction of a strong grassroots network
to mobilize around the issue of water privatization. Community groups can draw connections
between workers, the informal sector, churches, mosque and representatives of special interest
groups such as health and education workers.84
Central to the campaign is the organization of Local Action Committees (LACs) based on
the assumption that the “people in a particular area, institution or workplace are usually best able
79
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to decide what is best for their LAC in any particular situation.”

LACs register with the

Coordinating Committee and agree on an area of operation. LACs mobilize people in their area
and affiliating with religious bodies or other interests types like health workers.
successful committees have formed in the Maamobi, Legon and Tema areas.85

85

Ibid 59, p.3.

The most

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES:

The connection between water to the quality of life and human survival creates immense
opportunities to rally widespread support and mobilization against water privatization.

The

coalition has to date successfully maximized on this phenomena by refusing to engage in sectarian
politics, “CAPW aims to involve the maximum number of people…because we believe that
everyone has an interest in fighting against water privatization, whatever their views on any other
issues.”86
The general feeling of dissatisfaction with neo-liberal policies, which have led to a drop in
the quality of life for increasing numbers of people, also creates fertile ground for the cultivation of
a movement against the privatization of water. Drawing from previous experience with neo-liberal
policy has taught Ghanaians that multinationals are no “Father Christmas”, but profit motivated
corporations who must not be trusted with the control of Ghana’s water.87 However the political
climate of the aftermath of the 2000 elections creates difficulties for a campaign against water at
this juncture. The focus on electoral politics creates a “vacuum” of other forms of political activity
and organization. The left must “start all over…we are back to square one,” in the development of
theory and the creation of activists networks.88

Additionally, the relatively recent return to

“democratic” rule inhibits some people’s willingness to challenge government policy for fear of
undermining the perceived fragile state democracy in Ghana.89
Organizationally, the coalition’s strength lies the fact that key constituencies such as
workers, students religious bodies and communities have begun to mobilize over the water. Even
more significant is the highly democratic and interactive manner in which discussion and action
groups are operating. The focus of energy to the grassroots facilitates people’s ability to prioritize
their most urgent concerns and develop actions accordingly.
Furthermore, even in these early phases the coalition has managed to make connections
with activists working on related globalisation issues such as the cyanide spills, the WTO rounds
in Doha and the reviving jubilee 2000 movement. Making such connections serves to generate
ideas and alliances on water privatization and larger issues.90
However the coalition also faces the immense challenge of giving organized outlets for the
energies and sentiments against water privatization. The coalition in its youth has yet to network
among certain constituencies, and must continue to reaffirm and strengthen the commitment of key
groups.
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Though the rank and file supports the anti-water privatization campaign and the TUC
leadership announced its official position against the privatization deal, they have to date made no
call to action over the water issue. Their pro-active participation in the future is essential to the
success of the campaign.91
Another issue is the lack of women’s participation within the campaign.

While the

coalition counts on the support of some women at the grassroots level in LACs and churches, there
was a decided lack of women’s presence in many levels of the campaign: few women attend
student meetings or head affiliate organizations.9293 Although the issue of women’s political
participation is broader than the campaign itself, the coalition must exert constant vigilance in the
effort to incorporate the active participation of women into decision-making processes and
organizational activities.
The nature of the arena for debate presents challenges and opportunities for the coalition.
In contrast to previous regimes, the coalition has all channels of media at their disposal, as well as
the freedom of movement and association. This creates the potential of developing alliances with
journalists and utilizing the press and radio as educational and organizational tools. Additionally,
the government’s role in advocating the privatization of water through forums, articles, meetings
and advertisements in some ways assists to perpetuate national interest on the issue. Government
attacks on the campaign, particularly their slander of ISODEC is a double edged sword. If the
coalition utilizes the attacks to assert the unity and prominence of the coalition above any of its
individual members, then the government’s attacks may only give the coalition greater legitimacy
to represent a broad cross-section of the population.94
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CONCLUSION
Despite its short existence the movement emerging to address the impending privatization
of water has begun to create a dynamic and diverse alliance with political potential.
It is too early to deduce what implications this step in neo-liberal economic policy will
bode for the governments’ ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Ghanaian citizens.
However it can be noted that the topic of water privatization has sparked great controversy and
resistance, indicating the potential for tense developments.
How the movement will affect the future of water policy in Ghana remains to be seen. Yet
the challenge to the water privatization process has already caused the government to tread more
carefully as evidenced by the postponement of the next tariff increases. More importantly, the
mobilization around the water issue is creating a forum for the development of ideas and a tool for
political expression among largely disenfranchised groups. Hence the struggle against water
privatization is valuable not only for its ability to defend a valuable social commodity but for
developing peoples ability to defend, express and demand their rights. Also, the beginning of the
cross-dialogue between activists involved in related struggles show the potential for people to
make connections between policies and form a broader political perspective. These developments
are crucial in face of the void of spaces to advocate for alternatives to the current neo-liberal model
which gives no room for democracy, equity or self determination.

Suggestions for Further Study:
This paper addresses the developments, potentials and significance of a newly forming
social movement. Further study into the progression of the developing coalition and its activities
could add to a better understanding of the relevance of the anti-water privatization movement in
Ghana as well as shedding further light onto the questions I was only able to answer partially.
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ATTACHMENT B

The Metropolitan Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies of the towns and cities listed below are
not aware and have not
Water Systems in Business Unit A
Upper East

Upper West

Northern

Greater Accra

Volta

Bawku

Tumu

Gambaga

Accra

Nkwanta

Navrongo

Lawra

Walewale

Amasaman

Kete Krachi

Zebila

Jirapa

Gashiegu

Tema

Kadjebi

Bolgatanga

Nadawli

Saboba

Ada

Jasikan

Sandema

Wa

Saveluga

Hohoe

Tolon

Kpandu

Tamale

Ho

Yendi

Akasti

Zabzugu

Adedome

Bimbilla

Sogakope

Damongo

Denu

Bolo

Keta

Bongo

Salaga
5

5

13

4
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Water Systems in Business Unit B

Western

Central

Eastern

Brong-Ahafo

Ashanti

Juabeso

Dunkwa

Donkorkrom

Kintampo

Ejura

Wiawso

Fosu

Mpraeso

Wenchi

Mampong

Enchi

Twifo Praso

New Aberim

Atebubu

Offinso

Asankragwa

Asikuma

Begro

Kwame Danso

Anona

Tarkwa

Swedru

Kibi

Kete Krachi

Effiduase

Daboase

Ejumako

Kade

Techiman

Mankranso

Half Assini

Abura

Suhum

Nkoranza

Kumasi

Axim

Dunkwa

Akim Oda

Drobo

Ejisu

Nkwanta

Winneba

Nsawam

Domma

Kuntansase

Ahenkro
Takoradi

Saltpond

Dodowa

Sunyani

Juaso

Cape Coast

Akropong

Bechem

Bekwai

Elmina

Somanya

Kenyasi No. 1

Nkwanta

Atemposu

Tepa

Manso

Goaso

Obuasi
New Edubiase
On-Offin

WHY MUST PRIVATIZATION IN GHANA MUST BE
STOPPED
In the interest of two transnational corporations, vested interests
in Ghana, foreign governments and the World Bank conspire to
violate our Right to water.

Water is Life.

BUSINESS
UNIT B
REGIONS
Central
Eastern
Western
Ashanti
Brong Ahafo
TERM OF LEASE
10 Years

BUSINESS
UNIT A
REGIONS
Greater Accra
Volta
Northern
Upper East
Upper West
BIDDERS
Northumbrian – British
Vivendi – French
SAUR – French
TERM OF LEASE
30 Years
NUMBER OF CITIES
27 Years
POPULATION NOW
3.6 million
INVESTMENT
REQUIRED
US$ 1.351 billion

BIDDERS
Bi-Water-British
Nuon- Dutch
Generale Des’Eaux- French
Skanska - Swedish

NUMBER OF CITIES
73 Years
POPULATION NOW
3.9 million
INVESTMENT
REQUIRED
US$ 467 Million

